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Abstract Imagination has received a great deal of attention in different fields
such as psychology, philosophy and the cognitive sciences, in which some works
provide a detailed account of the mechanisms involved in the creation and elab-
oration of imaginary worlds. Although imagination has also been formalized
using different logical systems, none of them captures those dynamic mecha-
nisms. In this work, we take inspiration from the Common Frame for Imagi-
nation Acts, that identifies the different processes involved in the creation of
imaginary worlds, and we use it to define a dynamic formal system called the
Logic of Imagination Acts. We build our logic by using a possible-worlds se-
mantics, together with a new set of static and dynamic modal operators. The
role of the new dynamic operators is to call different algorithms that encode
how the formal model is expanded in order to capture the different mechanisms
involved in the creation and development of imaginary worlds. We provide the
This work is funded by EC FP7 grant 621403 (ERA Chair: Games Research Opportunities),
by the Project “Hybrid Intensional Logic” (ref. FFI2013-47126-P) given by the Spanish
MINECO, the project 2018-2020: Traducciones, lo´gicas combinadas, descripciones, lo´gica
intensiva, teor´ıa de tipos, lo´gica h´ıbrida, identidad, lo´gica y educacio´n (ref. FFI2017-82554),
given by the Spanish MICINN, and a doctoral grant from the Universitat Oberta de
Catalunya (UOC).
This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Erkenntnis.
The final authenticated version is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-019-
00136-z
J. Casas-Roma (corresponding author)
The Metamakers Institute,
Falmouth University (Falmouth, UK)
Tel.: +34 660 581 622
E-mail: joan.casasroma@falmouth.ac.uk
A. Huertas, M. E. Rodr´ıguez
Department of Computer Science, Multimedia and Telecommunication,
Universitat Oberta de Catalunya (Barcelona, Spain).
2 Joan Casas-Roma, Antonia Huertas, M. Elena Rodr´ıguez
definitions of the language, the semantics and the algorithms, together with
an example that shows how the model is expanded. By the end, we discuss
some interesting features of our system, and we point out to possible lines of
future work.
Keywords imagination · imaginary worlds · modal logic · dynamic logic ·
algorithms
1 Introduction and Motivations
Imagining is something we use everyday in our lives, and in a wide variety of
ways: when planning our next move in a chess game, when picturing how we
could decorate our new room, or even when listening to a story-teller, our mind
creates, develops and evaluates imaginary worlds aimed to guide our actions,
update our beliefs, or simply entertain us. Imagination has received a great
deal of attention by philosophers, cognitive scientists and psychologists (as it
can be seen in works like [24], [10], [19], or [13], among others). Its interest
within the studies of the mind is beyond any doubt, and its relation to other
mechanisms of the mind, such as emotions, behavior, desires and beliefs, makes
imagination particularly interesting in many different areas.
In the literature, there are many works that study the relation of imagi-
nation with respect to other mental attitudes, such as knowledge (as in [14]),
beliefs or desires, or how imagination affects our decision-making abilities (like
[18]), or our emotions (as in [22]); some of these works also provide insights on
how the mechanisms of creating and developing new imaginary worlds work
(like [20], [26] or [15]). These mechanisms are used to create new representa-
tions of alternative worlds, which were not in our mind before, and which will
be discarded once we have achieved our goal with respect to them.
The main goal of the present paper is to define a dynamic system that
allows to capture, using formal models based on modal logic, how imaginary
worlds are created and developed. Although there are different logical systems
that already deal with imagination, none of them focus on its dynamic aspect.
The theoretical background of our proposal is based on the so-called Common
Frame for Imagination Acts, which identifies the mechanisms that are used
in order to create and develop new imaginary worlds. In order to capture the
intuitions behind such theory, we define a formal syntax and semantics that,
guided by a set of algorithms, allow to model the dynamics of imaginary worlds.
The system we define provides a detailed account of how such dynamics work
in a formal setting, and thus provides a tool that can be used to study those
dynamics in greater detail in a formal, algorithmic setting.
After introducing the main motivations in the current section, we briefly
review the underlying theories and existing logics of imagination in Section 2,
and we point out how there are no dynamic logics of imagination. Throughout
Section 3, we define the syntax, models, algorithms and semantics of the Logic
of Imagination Acts, and we provide an example of the logic in use in Section
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4. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of the pros and cons of our proposal
in Section 5, and point out to some interesting lines of future work.
2 Theories and Logics of Imagination
In order to account for the dynamics of how imaginary worlds are created
and developed we will focus on the Common Frame for Imagination Acts,
introduced in [8], and which is mainly based on the theories of Nichols and
Stich in [20], Williamson in [26] and Langland-Hassan in [15]. The Common
Frame for Imagination Acts analyses how the previous works identify certain
mechanisms involved in the formation of imaginary worlds and fine-grains
those mechanisms into four different processes, called the Initialization, the
Description, the Default Evolution and the Unscripted Additions. Although
we provide more details on those processes in Section 3.3, they can be briefly
summarized as follows:
1. The Initialization process takes an initial premise and creates a brand-new
set of imaginary worlds (which can be formed by one or more worlds),
shaped according to the conditions specified by such initial premise. We
use the term imaginary scenario to refer to the set of imaginary worlds
that result from the execution of one imagination processes.
2. The Description uses certain rules to infer what other static details would
be the case in the imaginary scenario, based on what is already the case in
there. The emphasis on the “static” means that this process is responsible
for elaborating the state of affairs of an imaginary world in which nothing
has happened yet.
3. The Default Evolution is also used to infer what else would be the case in
the imaginary scenario but, conversely to the previous process, the Default
Evolution does take into account a certain action happening, and thus
changing the imaginary world in some way.
4. The Unscripted Additions correspond to the voluntary addition of new
premises to already existing imaginary worlds. The particularity of those
newly added premises is that they do not follow any particular rule, but
rather a desire of the agent to alter the imaginary world in such and such
way.
Throughout the rest of the present work we take the Common Frame for
Imagination Acts as our underlying theory, and so our formal system will aim
to represent and model the dynamics captured by the previous processes.
When considering formal systems, few authors have ventured into the un-
charted seas of logic and imagination. David Lewis, in [16] define a logic to
account for counterfactual reasoning by using a system of spheres and a modal
operator that moves the evaluation point to counterfactual worlds. Later, in
[21], Niiniluoto formalizes imagination as a propositional attitude and dis-
cusses some of its properties. Costa-Leite, in [9], goes one step beyond and
formalizes the distinction between “imagination”, “conception” and “possibil-
ity” through following the intuitions of Descartes and Hume. Wansing brings
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beliefs into the picture in [25] and uses neighborhood semantics and STIT me-
chanics to account for agentive imagination. Through various works like [2], [4]
and [3], Berto formalizes conceivability in both a paraconsistent and a classical
setting, and introduces the mechanics of “aboutness”, which determine what
is relevant for the agent to import conceiving an alternative world.
Even though these works highlight very interesting features of imagina-
tion, they all represent imagination in static, pre-determined scenarios, like
snapshots of a specific moment. Although Wansing’s approach goes one step
beyond and takes into account the agentive character of imagination, it still
works in predefined, tree-like structures: the agent can be seen as “choosing”
what to imagine, indeed, but these choices are already contained in the initial
model of the situation.
Our approach amends this and captures something that has been over-
looked in previous works: imagination is, in essence, dynamic. When we imag-
ine, we create and unfold worlds that are not real, but which nevertheless are
governed by a certain set of rules or mechanisms, as identified by the previ-
ously mentioned theories of imagination. Even though a first approach to a
dynamic logic of imagination acts is defined in [7], the resulting system ends
up being too shallow, and the dynamics of imagination end up being rather
simplified. In the next section, we define the Logic of Imagination Acts as a
formal system accounting for the dynamics of imagination, which is the main
contribution of the present work. The main aim of our proposal is to define
a set of algorithms that can be executed at any time over a formal model
and which will compute how this model is expanded by further developing an
imaginary world, following the mechanisms described in the Common Frame
for Imagination Acts. Due to this, our proposal is based on a possible-world
semantics, uses a modal logical language, and adds a set of dynamic algorithms
that detail how the model must be expanded, whenever they are executed.
3 The Logic of Imagination Acts
Throughout this section we introduce the definitions needed in order to define
the Logic of Imagination Acts. Nevertheless, we will need to refer to certain
elements of the system before explicitly defining them in a formal way.
Our main goal in this contribution is to provide a first approach to the
dynamic mechanisms involved in the creation and development of imaginary
worlds. Due to this, we choose to define our logic on a propositional language
in order to focus on the dynamic aspects of the way imaginary worlds are
added and expanded, while avoiding serious technical challenges that first-
order modal systems face with regards to their domains, as it can be seen in
works such as [11]. In this sense, we follow the approach of [25] in interpreting
expressions such as “Alice imagines a unicorn”, as the propositional expression
“Alice imagines that there is a unicorn”. As we point out in Section 5, a natural
direction of further work is to explore how this logic, and the algorithms defined
in it, could be expanded into a first-order setting.
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3.1 Syntax
The language of the Logic of Imagination Acts is formed by a countably infinite
set of atomic formulas, called ATOM, and represented by the lowercase letters
p, q, and so on. There is also a countably infinite set of nominals (taken from
hybrid logic), called NOM and represented by the lowercase letters i, j, and
such. Besides, we have a countably infinite set of atomic actions (or simply
actions), called ACT, and represented by the Greek letters α, β, and so on;
note that these actions will only be used, in our language, to sign a special
modal operator that we introduce in the further lines.
We use the standard propositional operators ¬,∧,∨,→ (standing for “nega-
tion”, “conjunction”, “disjunction” and “material implication”, respectively);
besides, we also use the hybrid1 operator @. We use bracket symbols (, [, ), ]
as usual (and we omit them when the context is clear).
We introduce four new dynamic operators, and four new static ones. In-
tuitively, each dynamic operator is responsible for calling one of the four al-
gorithms (which will be defined in Section 3.3), and each dynamic operator
has a corresponding static operator, used to evaluate the transitions created
by the related execution of the algorithm. The new dynamic operators are
Init(δ), Descr(ζ), Evo(α) and Add(δ), which are related to the static opera-
tors 〈δ〉I , 〈ζ〉D, 〈α〉E and 〈δ〉A, respectively. Aside form this, we also introduce
a new static modal operator 〈Img〉 standing for a general, process-independent
imagination operator.
The set FORM of well-formed formulas of the language are inductively
defined as follows:
i | p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ψ | ϕ ∨ ψ | ϕ→ ψ | @iϕ | 〈Img〉ϕ |
Init(δ) | Descr(ζ) | Evo(α) | Add(δ) |
〈δ〉Iϕ | 〈ζ〉Dϕ | 〈α〉Eϕ | 〈δ〉Aϕ
where i ∈ NOM, p ∈ ATOM, {ϕ,ψ} ⊆ FORM, δ ∈ FORM∗, ζ ∈ FACT and
α ∈ ACT; we explain in the following lines what these special sets of formulas
are2. We distinguish certain particular sets of formulas that are aimed to be
used only by certain operators:
– FORM∗ corresponds to the propositional fragment of FORM; we typically
refer to elements of FORM∗ by using δ, γ and such. Therefore, a formula
δ ∈ FORM∗ can be of the following form:
• p (for p ∈ ATOM)
1 In a nutshell, hybrid logic allows to uniquely identify possible worlds through a set of
nominals NOM. Then, a formula @iϕ expresses that “at world i, it is the case that ϕ”. The
addition of such operator to our logic can greatly increase its potential by allowing to express
what is the case in different stages of an imagination act. For a thorough introduction to
hybrid logic, we refer to [5], or [6].
2 The way we define the set of actions ACT is inspired by the way Propositional Dynamic
Logic, or PDL, defines a set of atomic programs Π0. In PDL (see [12]), these programs are
also used to sign a modal operator, just as we do in our case; nevertheless, PDL also defines
a set of operators over programs, which can be used to combine them in different ways.
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• ¬ϕ (for ϕ ∈ FORM∗)
• ϕ ∨ ψ (for {ϕ,ψ} ⊆ FORM∗)
• ϕ ∧ ψ (for {ϕ,ψ} ⊆ FORM∗)
• ϕ→ ψ (for {ϕ,ψ} ⊆ FORM∗)
– FACT is a particular subset of FORM, and it corresponds to the set of
formulas aimed to represent the factual rules in which the agent believes,
and which represent how certain conditions could give rise to certain con-
sequences; we typically refer to elements of FACT by using ζ, ζ1, ζ2 and so
on. We require every formula ζ ∈ FACT to be of the following form3:
• ϕ〈→〉ψ (for {ϕ,ψ} ⊆ FORM∗)
– SCRIPT is another particular subset of FORM, and it corresponds to the
set of formulas aimed to represent the scripts in which the agent believes,
and which represent what consequences, given certain conditions, an action
or event will trigger in an imaginary world; we typically refer to elements of
SCRIPT by using ξ1, ξ2 and such. We require every formula ξ ∈ SCRIPT
to be of one of the following forms, where [→]α ≡ ¬〈→〉α¬ as usual in
modal logic:
• ϕ〈→〉αψ (for {ϕ,ψ} ⊆ FORM∗ and α ∈ ACT)
• ϕ[→]αψ (for {ϕ,ψ} ⊆ FORM∗ and α ∈ ACT)
We introduce two symbols >,⊥ to refer to truth and falsity, respectively,
and we define them as follows (for p ∈ ATOM):
> ≡ p ∨ ¬p
⊥ ≡ p ∧ ¬p
Furthermore, and in order to distinguish particular formulas belonging to the
sets FACT and SCRIPT, we introduce two new symbols that will be used to
encode a combination of two different operators as follows (for some ζ ∈ FACT
and α ∈ ACT):
ϕ〈→〉ψ ≡ ϕ→ 〈ζ〉Dψ
ϕ〈→〉αψ ≡ ϕ→ 〈α〉Eψ
The intuitive reading of the dynamic operators is the following: formula
Init(δ) is read as “the agent creates a new imaginary world using the initial
premise δ”; formula Descr(ζ) is read as “the agent elaborates on the static
details of an imaginary world by using the factual rule ζ”; formula Evo(α) is
read as “the agent elaborates on the consequences that action α would have
in the imaginary world”; lastly, formula Add(δ) is read as “the agent adds a
new premise δ into the imaginary world”.
The associated static operators can be intuitively interpreted as follows:
formula 〈δ〉Iϕ is interpreted as “after an execution of the Initialization process,
3 In a nutshell, we only allow the antecedent and the consequent to belong to the proposi-
tional fragment of the language because we are interested in seeing how imaginary worlds are
created and developed: modal and hybrid operators convey information about other worlds
and the relations between different worlds. Leaving aside the technical complications that
this would involve, imagining about other worlds or their relations falls outside the scope of
the current goal of this work.
The Logic of Imagination Acts 7
with initial premise δ, the agent imagines a world in which ϕ is the case”.
The rest of the corresponding static formulas are read similarly. Operator
〈Img〉 is intuitively interpreted as a kind of “wildcard” imagination operator
concerning any of the mechanisms involved in the elaboration of imaginary
worlds. As such, a formula 〈Img〉ϕ is interpreted as “through some process of
imagination, the agent imagines a world where ϕ holds”, or, for short, “the
agent imagines a world where ϕ holds”.
Although the agent’s beliefs about the real world play a very important
role in imaginary worlds, we define the Logic of Imagination Acts without
using an explicit doxastic operator. The reasons for doing so is because our
current goal is to focus on the dynamics described by the four algorithms that
will capture the processes of the Common Frame for Imagination Acts: adding
more technical complexity to the setting could easily deviate us from our goal,
and so we have decided to omit an explicit formal representation of beliefs
for now. However, in the next section we explain how the way we define our
models still allows us to implicitly account for beliefs up to the extend that
we need them for the dynamic mechanisms captured in the logic.
3.2 The Models for Imagination Acts
We define a Model for Imagination Acts as a structureM = 〈W,RI , RD, RE , RA,
V,N〉, where:
– W is a non-empty set of elements called possible-worlds or states of affairs.
We use the lowercase letters w, v, u, . . . to refer to the elements of W .
– RI ⊆W ×W × FORM∗ is a ternary relation called the initialization rela-
tion. Intuitively, an element (w, v, δ) captures how, through the Initializa-
tion process, and by using an initial premise δ and taking w as the world of
reference, a new imaginary world v is created. We use triplets of the form
(w, v, δ), (u, z, γ), . . . to refer to elements of RI .
– RD ⊆W ×W ×FACT is a ternary relation called the description relation.
Intuitively, an element (w, v, ζ) captures how, through the Description pro-
cess, and by using a factual rule ζ ∈ FACT and taking w as the world of
reference, an imaginary world v resulting from the application of ζ is cre-
ated. We use triplets of the form (w, v, ζ1), (u, z, ζ2), . . . to refer to elements
of RD.
– RE ⊆ W ×W × ACT is a ternary relation called the evolution relation.
Intuitively, an element (w, v, α) captures how, through the Default Evolu-
tion process, by performing (or imagining to perform) an action α ∈ ACT,
and by taking w as the world of reference, an imaginary world v is cre-
ated as a result of action α taking place. We use triplets of the form
(w, v, α), (u, z, β), . . . to refer to elements of RE .
– RA ⊆ W × W × FORM∗ is a ternary relation called the addition rela-
tion. Intuitively, an element (w, v, δ) captures how, through the Unscripted
Addition process, using a premise δ, and by taking w as the world of
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reference, an imaginary world v is created. We use triplets of the form
(w, v, δ), (u, z, γ), . . . to refer to elements of RA.
– V : ATOM→ P(W ) is a function from atomic formulas of the language to
subsets of the power set of W , called the valuation function. Intuitively, it
keeps track of which atomic formulas are true at which subset of possible
worlds.
– N : NOM → W is an exhaustive function setting, for each element of
NOM, a possible world in W , and called the nominal function. Intuitively,
it specifies which nominal is used to identify each world.
Even though neither the language nor the models explicitly account for
beliefs, we argue that our logic implicitly model beliefs in the following way:
– Any of the initial real possible worlds account for a state of affairs the
agent believes to be possible. As we have no doxastic ordering, we consider
that the agent believes them all to be equally plausible.
– The sets of formulas FACT and SCRIPT capture the rules the agent be-
lieves in, regarding the way imaginary worlds can be developed.
Following these conventions, we can focus on the dynamics of imagination acts
without adding more technical complexity, but still being able to refer to the
agent’s beliefs when needed. As we point out in Section 5, extending the system
with an explicit doxastic relation is a rather interesting line of future work. We
do not elaborate on this point for reasons of space, but, as we already anticipate
in the aforementioned section, effectively integrating doxastic models into our
setting would present some major technical challenges that fall outside the
scope of our present goal.
3.3 The Algorithms
We now proceed to define four different algorithms, each one accounting for one
of the four distinct processes involved in the creation and development of imag-
inary worlds. During the execution of any of these four algorithms, a Model for
Imagination ActsM is expanded into its expanded model M+. We refer to any
of the elements ofM+ as the expanded element (with its corresponding name),
and we identify them as M+ = 〈W+, R+I , R+D, R+E , R+A, V +, N+〉. Note, how-
ever, that not each algorithm will expand every element of M; nevertheless,
we will still talk about the expanded version of such elements, when referring
to them either during, or just after the execution of one of such algorithms4.
Even though each algorithm has its own particularities, there are certain
processes within them that are very similar, both in the way they work and
in their outcome. We provide a complete specification for each algorithm,
but we will assign names or labels to some of those internal processes. The
4 Each one of the four algorithms we define in the following pages is executed upon a
model M. On the first step of their execution, there are certain initial conditions that each
algorithm has to check; if any of those conditions is not fulfilled, the algorithm does not
expand model M in any way; in that case, we consider that M+ =M.
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reason for doing so is to help the reader to identify, beforehand, what these
processes do, and identify that they stand for similar processes appearing in
the other algorithms. Note that, even if they intend to do the same thing,
two similar processes in two different algorithms might still be technically
different: they may refer to different parts of the model, or they may alter
them in different ways. The core part of each algorithm, however, is quite
different in the way it works and the rules it follows to modify the model. An
exception would be the cases of the Init and the Add algorithm, which work
almost in the same way, but which requires different parameters; in particular,
the Init algorithm builds up on a real possible world, while the Add algorithm
requires an imaginary possible world. For the sake of clarity, nevertheless, we
still provide an independent definition for each one of them.
It is important to keep in mind that the execution of the algorithms is
not required to follow any specific order. If there is yet no imaginary world
created, we do need to start with an execution of the algorithm responsible
for handling the Initialization of the scenario, but, after this, the agent may
choose to elaborate on the imaginary worlds by using any of the other three
algorithms, without the need to follow any specific order.
3.3.1 The Init Algorithm
This algorithm corresponds to the Initialization process, and it handles the
creation of new imaginary worlds from scratch, based on a certain world of
reference representing the state of affairs of the real world, as believed by
the agent, and by using a certain initial premise determining the content of
the imagining to be initiated. As the authors claim in [8], the effect that the
so-called world of reference have upon these brand-new imaginary worlds is
captured by importing all those facts (i.e.; atomic propositions) that are true
in the real world of reference5, as long as they are consistent with the initial
premise δ used to create the new imaginary worlds. The whole process is
depicted in Figure 1.
The InitAlg computes the initial act of imagining a certain premise δ ∈
FORM∗ while taking a real possible world wR as the world of reference, which
corresponds to the following call:
InitAlg(δ, wR)
The algorithm follows these steps:
1. Check initial conditions: If world wR is not a real possible world (that is,
if there exists some v such that (v, wR,#) is in either RI , RD, RE , or RA,
being # one of the corresponding formulas required by each accessibility
relation), do nothing. Similarly, if δ is contradictory (that is, if δ ≡ ⊥), do
nothing.
5 Roughly speaking, this process aims to account for a ceteris paribus effect in the new
imaginary world. As argued in [4], conceived and imagined worlds are usually governed by
such effect.
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ψ, . . . ψ, δ, . . .
Clamp initial premise: δ
Import atomic formulas
Fig. 1 Initiating the imagining using an initial premise.
2. Compute DNF : In order to handle the formula in an efficient way, we
compute the Disjunctive Normal Form (DNF) of δ, to which we refer as
DNF(δ) = δ1 ∨ . . . ∨ δn.
3. Create imaginary worlds: Create new imaginary possible worlds w1, . . . , wn
for each clause δ1, . . . , δn in DNF(δ). This defines the expanded set of pos-
sible worlds as follows:
W+ = W ∪ {w1, . . . , wn}
4. Expand accessibility relation: Once the new possible worlds have been cre-
ated, the InitAlg must create the new initialization relations expressing
that, by imagining formula δ and taking wR as the world of reference, the
agent creates new imaginary worlds w1, . . . , wn. This defines the expanded
set of initialization relations as follows:
R+I = RI ∪
( ⋃
i=1...n
{(wR, wi, δ)}
)
5. Expand nominal structure: Now, the InitAlg must add a set of new nom-
inals to refer to the newly created imaginary worlds. This defines both the
expanded set of nominals, by adding one new nominal ki for each new pos-
sible world wi, and the expanded nominal function, which is a functional
extension of N relating the new pairs of nominals and possible worlds:
NOM+ = NOM ∪ {k1, . . . , kn}
N+ = N ∪
( ⋃
i=1...n
{(ki, wi)}
)
6. Expand valuation function: Last but not least, the InitAlg must expand
the valuation function to account for what is the case in the new imaginary
possible worlds. In order to do so, the algorithm must account for both the
atoms that are present in each δi, and also for the atoms that are true
in the world of reference wR and which should be imported to the new
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imaginary worlds, provided they do not appear in δi; this is so because any
atom appearing in δi would have been given priority, with respect to the
atoms holding at wR. Therefore, the definition of the expanded valuation
function involves two different phases:
(a) Clamp new atoms: Firstly, the InitAlg must set the new valuation
functions according to the atoms p appearing in δi, for each new imag-
inary world wi:
V +1 (p) = V (p) ∪
(⋃
i
{wi | p is a positive literal appearing in δi}
)
(b) Import existing atoms: Then, it must import all the atoms holding at
world wR, provided they do not appear in δi, for each new imaginary
possible world wi:
V +(p) = V +1 (p) ∪
(⋃
i
{wi | wR ∈ V +1 (p) and p is not a literal of δi}
)
7. The InitAlg has finished its execution: a new set of imaginary possible
worlds satisfying δ has been created, and these worlds are now accessible
through the initialization relation RI from the world of reference w
R.
3.3.2 The Descr Algorithm
In order to capture the Description process, the DescrAlg will make use of
the so-called factual rules, which are represented in our language by formulas
belonging to FACT. In brief, factual rules are a kind of implication-based
formula capturing a sort of hypothetical conditional of the form “if ϕ was the
case, then ψ would also be the case”; as we saw in Section 3.1, this notion of
hypothetical condition is captured using operator 〈→〉. This kind of rules are
used in the Description process to express that if the imaginary world fulfills
a certain condition, then it could also fulfill a certain outcome as well. It is
important to note that, even though the Init process may have created more
than one new imaginary world, the execution of the Descr process is focused on
one of such imaginary worlds. In other words, the agent do not simultaneously
elaborate the static details of all the possible imaginary worlds that have been
created, but rather chooses to elaborate the state of affairs represented in one
of them; this also holds for the Evo and Add processes as well. Nevertheless,
as the algorithms can be executed at any time, and by choosing any admitted
world as the world of reference, it is possible for the agent to also elaborate
the details of a different imaginary world, although this requires a different
execution of the relevant algorithm.
This elaboration of the imaginary world, nevertheless, must be formally
handled in a very specific way. We want our formal models to be able to keep
track of the different imaginative processes the agent uses, and to show how
they affect the elaboration of the imaginary worlds. Therefore, if we were to
represent the application of the rule “if it was raining, I would be carrying
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and umbrella” by adding the fact “I am carrying an umbrella” to the already
existing imaginary world satisfying the fact “it is raining”, we would lose track,
in the formal model, of how that world became such in which I am also carrying
an umbrella.
Taking these considerations, we want the Description process to be repre-
sented, in our formal models, as an accessibility relation linking two different
worlds: the world of reference, where the antecedent ϕ of the factual rule ex-
pressing that “if ϕ was the case, then ψ would also be the case” holds, and
a different imaginary world, similar to the world of reference in everything,
except by the fact that ψ also holds at that new world as a result of applying
that specific factual rule. In other words, these formulas (and the way they are
processed by our logical system) represents a kind of Modus Ponens rule in
which the antecedent is evaluated at the world of reference, but the consequent
affects a different accessible world6.
The execution of the algorithm representing the Description process, there-
fore, will need a world of reference wR and a certain formula ϕ〈→〉ψ ∈ FACT.
Then, the algorithm will need to check whether the antecedent ϕ is true at
wR and, if it is, create a new imaginary world v, accessible from wR, and in
which ψ holds; the rest of atomic formulas determining the state of affairs of
the new world v will be taken from wR. In other words, the only changes that
v will have with respect to wR are those changes needed to make ψ true at v.
Figure 2 represents how the Description process would work.
A call to the DescrAlg needs a factual rule ζ ∈ FACT and an imaginary
possible world as the world of reference wR, as follows:
DescrAlg(ζ, wR)
The algorithm follows these steps:
1. Check initial conditions: If world wR is a real world (that is, there is no v
such that (v, wR,#) is in neither RI , RD, RE , nor RA, being # one of the
corresponding formulas required by each accessibility relation), do nothing.
2. Compute DNF : Formula ζ ∈ FACT is required to be of the form ζ = ϕ〈→〉ψ
(where {ϕ,ψ} ⊆ FORM∗). Now, the DescrAlg must check whether the an-
tecedent of such formula is true at the world of reference and, if it is, then
it must elaborate on the description of the imaginary world by clamping
its consequent to a new imaginary world (or several new ones, depending
6 It is worth noting how this kind of hypothetical conditionals are somewhat similar to
the kind of formulas David Lewis is interested in [16]. Nevertheless, Lewis’ use is different
from ours: in his work, Lewis evaluates a formula of the kind ϕ → ψ at a world aimed
to represent the real world, and the operator → moves the whole evaluation point to an
accessible counterfactual world in order to assess whether the conditional ϕ → ψ holds in
there. His way of evaluating hypothetical conditionals, therefore, is by moving the whole
conditional to an alternative world. Our way of understanding them, however, will be to
asses whether the antecedent ϕ holds in the current world of evaluation, and if so, then
create a new world fulfilling ψ and defined by taking the current one as the reference. Our
understanding of this kind of conditionals, therefore, will be used to determine the way a
certain imaginary world could change, given the information provided by the specific formula
being evaluated.
The Logic of Imagination Acts 13
ϕ,ψ,
. . .
χ, ϕ, ψ,
. . .Factual rule: ϕ〈→〉χ
As antecedent ϕ holds at
origin, clamp consequent χ
Import atomic formulas
Fig. 2 Follow a factual rule to elaborate on the static details.
on the form of the consequent). If M, wR  ϕ (the satisfiability symbol is
introduced later on in Section 3.4, but in this case it expresses that the
antecedent of ζ holds at the world of reference wR), then the DescrAlg
must compute DNF(ψ) = ψ1∨ . . .∨ψn (that is, the DNF of the consequent
of ζ).
3. Create imaginary worlds: The algorithm must create n new imaginary pos-
sible worlds w1, . . . , wn, one for each clause in ψ1 ∨ . . . ∨ ψn. This defines
the expanded set of possible worlds as follows:
W+ = W ∪ {w1, . . . , wn}
4. Expand accessibility relation: Create new RD relations linking the world of
reference wR with each new world w1, . . . , wn created in the previous step.
This defines the expanded set of description relations as follows:
R+D = RD ∪
( ⋃
i=1...n
{(wR, wi, ζ)}
)
5. Expand nominal structure: The DescrAlg must now add a set of new nom-
inals to refer to the newly created imaginary worlds. Again, this defines
both the expanded set of nominals and the expanded nominal function:
NOM+ = NOM ∪ {k1, . . . , kn}
N+ = N ∪
( ⋃
i=1...n
{(ki, wi)}
)
6. Expand valuation function: Once more, the algorithm must account for
both the atoms that are present in each ψi, and also for the atoms that are
true in the world of reference wR and which should be imported to the new
imaginary worlds, provided they do not appear in ψi. Again, the definition
of the expanded valuation function involves two different phases:
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(a) Clamp new atoms: Firstly, the DescrAlg must set the new valuation
functions according to the atoms p appearing in ψi, for each new imag-
inary possible world wi:
V +1 (p) = V (p) ∪
(⋃
i
{wi | p is a positive literal appearing in ψi}
)
(b) Import existing atoms: Then, it must import all the atoms that are true
at world wR, provided they do not appear in ψi, for each new imaginary
possible world wi:
V +(p) = V +1 (p) ∪
(⋃
i
{wi | wR ∈ V +1 (p) and p is not a literal of ψi}
)
7. The DescrAlg has finished its execution: a new set of imaginary possible
worlds has been created as a result of the agent following a factual rule
ζ describing what else could be the case in a particular imaginary world
fulfilling certain conditions. Moreover, these new imaginary worlds are ac-
cessible through the description relation RD from the world of reference
wR.
3.3.3 The Evo Algorithm
The main difference with respect to the previous DescrAlg is that the EvoAlg
involves a certain action or event to happen. In this case, the algorithm will
need to use formulas belonging to the set SCRIPT, which have the form
ϕ〈→〉αψ, and which encode something like “if ϕ was the case, and action
α happened, then ψ would also be the case”. In this case, we also want to cap-
ture the sense of “modal conditional” by evaluating whether the antecedent
of a script holds, at the world of reference, and, if it does so, then clamp the
consequent of such script into a new accessible imaginary world. Note that, in
this case, though, we cannot use a“simple modal conditional”, as we did in the
previous case, but instead a “signed modal conditional”, which would depend
on a certain action α.
The way of executing the EvoAlg, though, is different from the DescrAlg.
Whereas in the previous case our agent picked up a specific factual rule and
used it to elaborate on the scenario, we do not want our agent, in this case,
to imagine that a single script affects the scenario, but rather to imagine that
a certain action α takes place, and then infer every consequence that α would
carry with it: this represents a major change in the way the algorithms for the
Description and the Default Evolution processes will work.
The motivations behind this decision are based on the fact that, although
we can choose to elaborate the static details of an imaginary world in a step-
by-step manner, when elaborating on the consequences of certain events or
actions, we are not as selective as with the static details. Consider an imagining
about a tea-party in which the kettle is burning hot (and so is the tea inside
of it) and in which we are really thirsty; now, say that we imagine to drink the
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whole cup in a single gulp. Would we typically imagine that, by drinking the
whole cup of burning-hot tea, we just become satiated, without taking into
account which other consequences would follow from drinking the burning-
hot tea? Would we not imagine as well that we would burn our mouths, by
drinking the burning-hot tea in a single gulp?
Taking this into account, we claim that, while the static elaboration of
an imaginary scenario can follow particular factual rules, one at a time, the
dynamic elaboration of it is must be based on an action occurring, and must
take into account all the consequences of such action; that is, it must take
into account all the scripts detailing the consequences of a certain action α,
as depicted in Figure 3. Note that, in the Figure, we have associated, to each
script and each of its consequents, a numerical super-index in order to facilitate
seeing what consequences each script bears with it.
ϕ,ψ, χ,
. . .
ϕ, ψ, χ,
η1, λ1, ξ3,
. . .
ϕ, ψ, χ,
γ2, ξ3,
. . .
(...)
α α α
Scripts for action α:
(ϕ〈→〉α (η ∧ λ))1
(ψ〈→〉α γ)2
(ψ ∧ χ[→]α ξ)3
. . .
Fig. 3 The scripts determine all the possible consequences of an action.
Following the considerations pointed out in the previous paragraphs, the
argument needed for this algorithm is not a script belonging to SCRIPT, but
rather an action α ∈ ACT; however, and as we explain in brief, the algorithm
then uses the scripts ξ ∈ SCRIPT in order to develop the imaginary scenario.
It is worth noting that, during the development of the algorithm, the ele-
ments of the expanded model will be defined recursively over a series of loops.
Due to this, there is a convention that, for the sake of simplicity, we introduce
in our notation. In particular, and due to the fact that the algorithm involves
looping over possibly many formulas, the expansions of the corresponding el-
ements W+, R+E , V
+, . . . are begin accumulated at each loop. Therefore, we
assume that, whenever we refer to any element W,RE , V, . . . we are referring
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to the most “updated” version of that element, in the sense of already including
whatever has been added to it in the previous loop7.
Thus, the EvoAlg needs an action α ∈ ACT, which the agent would imagine
happening, and an imaginary world as the world of reference wR, as follows:
EvoAlg(α,wR)
Now, the algorithm must follow these steps:
1. Check initial conditions: If world wR is a real world, do nothing; if α does
not appear in any formula within SCRIPT, do nothing (it would mean that
the agent has no beliefs at all about the consequences of action α).
2. Create queue of scripts: Each formula ξ ∈ SCRIPT is either of the form
ϕ〈→〉αψ or of the form ϕ[→]αψ, for some α ∈ ACT. Create a queue Sα of
formulas sorted as follows8:
– Firstly, look for all the diamond-formulas in SCRIPT which are about α,
and add them to the queue Sα while prioritizing the ones with the least
complex antecedent (that is, the ones whose antecedent has less atomic
formulas); for example, a formula p〈→〉α... has more priority than a
formula p ∨ q〈→〉α.... Formulas with the same antecedent complexity
are sorted sequentially.
– Secondly, look for all box-formulas in SCRIPT that are about α, and
add them to the queue while prioritizing as well the ones with the least
complex antecedent.
3. Loop through the scripts: This loops form the central part of this algorithm.
The loop starts by evaluating the first formula ξ1 ∈ Sα, and keeps looping
until it has evaluated every script in the queue9.
3(a) Evaluate diamond-formula: If the current script ξ ∈ Sα being evaluated
is of the form ϕ〈→〉αψ, and if its antecedent ϕ holds at world wR (that
is, if M, wR  ϕ), do:
i. Compute DNF : Compute the DNF of the consequent, DNF(ψ) =
ψ1 ∨ . . . ∨ ψn.
ii. Create imaginary worlds: Create n new imaginary worlds w1, . . . , wn,
one for each ψ1∨ . . .∨ψn. This defines the expanded set of possible
7 We can draw a parallelism with the way variables are usually handled in programming
languages. In there, it is typical to override the value of a variable by using its own value;
for instance, one can increase the value of an integer index i by saying i = i+ 1.
8 In a nutshell, we process 〈→〉α formulas first to give priority to [→]α formulas. Last
evaluated formulas could override something already added by previous formulas, and we
claim that those scripts detailing necessary consequences of α should have priority over
scripts detailing possible consequences of it.
9 The idea behind this loop is that, conversely to what happened with the Description
process (in which the agent elaborated the scenario step by step by picking a single factual
rule each time), in this case the agent imagines performing an action. Therefore, the agent
must check for all the consequences of such action, which are described (according to their
preconditions) by the formulas in SCRIPT; as we have already argued by the beginning of
the current section, the reason for doing so is that one cannot imagine that she performs an
action, and then that only some of its consequences happen.
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worlds as follows:
W+ = W ∪ {w1, . . . , wn}
iii. Expand accessibility relation: Create new RE relations from w
R to
each new imaginary world wi, signed with action α:
R+E = RE ∪
( ⋃
i=1...n
{(wR, wi, α)}
)
iv. Check nominal structure: Similarly to what happened in the other
algorithms, the EvoAlg must now add a set of new nominals to
refer to the newly created imaginary worlds. This defines both the
expanded set of nominals, by adding one new nominal ki for each
new possible world wi created during the current execution of the
present algorithm, and the expanded nominal function, which is a
functional extension of N relating the new pairs of nominals and
possible worlds:
NOM+ = NOM ∪ {k1, . . . , kn}
N+ = N ∪
( ⋃
i=1...n
{(ki, wi)}
)
v. Expand valuation function - Clamp new atoms: Set the valuation
of each new imaginary world wi according to the consequences of
the corresponding clause ψi in DNF(ψ); note that, in this case, we
do not yet import the atomic formulas of the world of reference,
as we first need to keep evaluating the consequences of action α
according to the other formulas in Sα: we do this because box-
formulas may also affect the atomic valuation of the new imaginary
worlds being created right now, and this must be prioritized over
importing atomic formulas from wR:
V +(p) = V (p) ∪
(⋃
i
{wi | p is a positive literal appearing in ψi}
)
3(b) Evaluate box-formulas: If the current script ξ ∈ Sα is of the form ϕ[→
]αψ, and if its antecedent ϕ holds at the world of reference wR (that is,
if M, wR  ϕ), do:
i. Compute DNF : Compute the DNF of the consequent, DNF(ψ) =
ψ1 ∨ . . . ∨ ψm.
ii. Loop over already existing worlds: When evaluating box-formulas
within the script queue, there are some considerations that are
worth clarifying. Whereas diamond-formulas express that certain
outcomes could follow from certain antecedent, box-formulas state
that certain outcomes must follow. Therefore, box-formulas should
also take into account those new imaginary worlds that have al-
ready been created when evaluating diamond-formulas, and apply
their corresponding consequences to them as well.
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Thus, if there exists at least one world wi such that (w
R, wi, α) ∈
RE (that is, if at least one new imaginary world has been already
created during the current execution of this algorithm), then each
possible consequence ψj in DNF(ψ) must be handled while tak-
ing into account those already existing imaginary worlds. In order
to handle this, the algorithm must loop over the already existing
possible worlds wi created during the current execution of the al-
gorithm, and, for each wi, do:
A. Create new imaginary worlds: For the already existing imagi-
nary world wi being considered, which we will call wim through-
out the current loop, the algorithm must create m − 1 new
imaginary possible worlds wij , for j = 1, . . . , (m − 1), and be-
ing m determined by DNF(ψ) = ψ1 ∨ . . .∨ψm; this defines the
expanded set of possible worlds as follows10:
W+ = W ∪ {wi1 , . . . , wi(m−1)}
B. Expand accessibility relation: Create, for each new possible imag-
inary world, new RE relations as follows:
R+E = RE ∪
( ⋃
j=1...(m−1)
{(wR, wij , α)}
)
C. Expand nominal structure: Create and associate new nominals
to these new imaginary worlds. This defines both the expanded
set of nominals, and the expanded nominal function as follows:
NOM+ = NOM ∪ {ki1 , . . . , ki(m−1)}
N+ = N ∪
( ⋃
j=1...(m−1)
{(kij , wij )}
)
D. Expand valuation function - Clamp new atoms: Set the valua-
tion of each new imaginary world wij according to the conse-
quences of the corresponding clause ψj in DNF(ψ). Note that,
in the previous step, we have created m − 1 new imaginary
worlds; this results from the fact that, before evaluating the
current box-formula, we already had at least one existing imagi-
nary world created in a previous step of the current execution of
10 In order to clarify the intuitions behind this step, suppose that the algorithm is evalu-
ating a box-formula that represents m alternative outcomes: by following the way our other
algorithms have been working, we should create m new possible imaginary worlds to account
for each one of those outcomes. However, if there already exists an imaginary possible world
(possibly as a result of evaluating a diamond-formula), then one of such outcomes should be
represented in the world that already exists —for, otherwise, if we created m new imaginary
worlds, aside from the already existing one, we would have m + 1 new possible worlds to
account for just m alternative outcomes represented in the current box-formula. Therefore,
when evaluating a box-formula upon an already existing imaginary world, we only have to
create m− 1 new worlds.
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this algorithm (probably while evaluating a diamond-formula).
Now, as DNF(ψ) = ψ1 ∨ . . . ∨ ψm, and as we have used index
j = 1, . . . , (m−1) for the new imaginary worlds created in this
loop, we must associate the world wim , which was the one that
already existed when entering the current loop, with the clause
ψm of DNF(ψ), and associate the rest of the newly created
imaginary worlds wij with the rest of the clauses in DNF(ψj),
for j = 1, . . . , (m−1). The clamping of new atoms, in this case,
must proceed in three different steps or phases.
Firstly, as the newly created worlds wij are meant to be copies
of the original diamond-world wim , the algorithm needs to en-
sure that those worlds wij satisfy the same atomic propositions
as wim : in other words, it should add every world wij to the
valuation function of any atom satisfied by wim as follows:
V +copy(p) = V (p) ∪
( ⋃
j=1...(m−1)
{wij | wim ∈ V (p)}
)
Secondly, the algorithm must proceed and clamp the positive
atoms in each clause ϕj to their corresponding imaginary world
wij , as usual:
V +add(p) = V
+
copy(p) ∪
( ⋃
j=1...m
{wij | p is a positive literal in ψj}
)
Thirdly, it could be the case that the new box-formula being
evaluated forces certain atomic formulas to be false at a cer-
tain imaginary world. In order to account for that, we follow the
“inverse” of the process we have been following when clamp-
ing new atoms: this time, we look for any atom appearing as a
negative literal in the corresponding clause ϕj and, if the imag-
inary world wij appears in the valuation function of such atom,
we remove it (in order to force that atom to be false in that
world):
V +1 (p) = V
+
add(p) \
( ⋃
j=1...m
{wij | p is a negative literal in ψj}
)
iii. Create witness world11: Conversely, if there are no new imaginary
worlds created during the current execution of the algorithm (be-
cause, for instance, there are no diamond-formulas in the current
set of scripts), then the box-formula being evaluated must create a
11 The relation between this step and step 3(b).ii could be understood as an “if ... else”
statement, in terms of programming languages. Namely, the algorithm first checks whether
there already exists any imaginary world and, if it does, goes through the corresponding
“if” branch; otherwise (or “else”), if there are no already existing imaginary worlds, the
algorithm must go through this current branch. Note, therefore, that both branches are
never going to be executed for the same script, but rather just one of the two branches.
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so-called “witness-world” to account for the consequences described
by it12.
Therefore, if there exists no world wi such that (w
R, wi, α) ∈ RE
(which would be either because there are no diamond-formulas re-
ferring to action α, or because wR does not fulfill the antecedents
of such formulas), then do the following:
A. Create imaginary worlds: Create m new imaginary possible
worlds, one for each ψ1 ∨ . . . ∨ ψm. This defines the expanded
set of possible worlds as follows:
W+ = W ∪ {w1, . . . , wm}
B. Expand accessibility relation: Create new RE accessibility rela-
tions from the world of reference wR to these new imaginary
worlds as follows:
R+E = RE ∪
( ⋃
j=1...m
{(wR, wi, α)}
)
C. Expand nominal structure: Create and associate new nominals
to these new imaginary worlds. This defines both the expanded
set of nominals, and the expanded nominal function as follows:
NOM+ = NOM ∪ {k1, . . . , km}
N+ = N ∪
( ⋃
i=1...m
{(ki, wi)}
)
D. Expand valuation function - Clamp new atoms: Set the valu-
ation of each new imaginary world wi according to the conse-
quences of the corresponding clause ψi in DNF(ψ):
V +1 (p) = V (p) ∪
(⋃
i
{wi | p is a positive literal in ψi}
)
iv. Expand valuation function - Import existing atoms: After creating
new worlds if necessary, the EvoAlg must import all the atoms that
are true at the world of reference wR, provided they do not appear
in ψi, for each new imaginary possible world wi. Note that, even in
the case of imaginary worlds created by using diamond-formulas,
12 It is worth mentioning that, in modal logic, the box operator  has a sort of “vacuous” or
“trivial” truth-condition: namely, if a world w has no accessibility relations at all, then every
formula of the form ϕ would be vacuously true in there; as there are no worlds accessible
from w, then every world accessible from w satisfies ϕ. That being said, we do not want
our EvoAlg to conform to this fact, when evaluating a box-formula. One may argue that,
if no diamond-formula about α has been previously evaluated, and so no new worlds have
been created, then every box-formula about α could be true without the need of creating
any world at all as a consequence of the agent imagining it. Nevertheless, this is not the way
we want these formulas to behave, regarding the development of imaginary worlds, and so
we still require our EvoAlg to create, at least, one witness world for a box-formula, in case
there exist none yet.
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this must be done after having evaluated the box-formulas, as they
may require to clamp further atoms in those worlds; importing ex-
isting atoms before evaluating box-formulas would probably import
atomic formulas that would need to be removed afterwards as a re-
quirement of the box-formulas being processed. The last step of the
expanded valuation function, therefore, is as follows:
V +(p) = V +1 (p) ∪
(⋃
i
{wi | wR ∈ V +1 (p), p not a literal of ψi}
)
4. The EvoAlg has finished its execution: a new set of imaginary worlds have
been created as a result of evaluating the consequences of a certain action
or event α, according to the scripts believed by the agent, and which detail
what would likely happen in the imaginary world, if α took place in there.
3.3.4 The Add Algorithm
The AddAlg is responsible for computing the voluntary addition of new premises
into the imaginary scenario, and it is closely related to the InitAlg. Whereas
in the Initialization the agent creates a new imaginary scenario by taking real-
ity as the reference, in this case the agent decides to clamp a new premise into
an already existing imaginary scenario. In this case, we go back to the agent
choosing to clamp an arbitrary formula into the imagining, as we do not need
to restrict ourselves to any limited set of formulas that could be used, as we
did in the previous two algorithms. Figure 4 depicts how this process works.
ψ, . . . ψ, δ, . . .
Clamp new premise: δ
Import atomic formulas
Fig. 4 Adding new premises into the imagining.
Note that, although this algorithm is almost identical to the InitAlg, there
is still an important difference that justifies that we have defined two distinct
algorithms: whereas the InitAlg creates new imaginary worlds by using a
real world as its referent, the AddAlg creates new imaginary worlds, but by
adding a new premise into an already existing imaginary world. Consequently,
we can say that the range of possible worlds available to both algorithms
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is complementary, in the sense that the InitAlg can only use real possible
worlds, and the AddAlg can only use imaginary possible worlds.
A call to the AddAlg needs a certain formula δ ∈ FORM∗ and an imaginary
possible world as the world of reference wR, as follows:
AddAlg(δ, wR)
The algorithm follows these steps:
1. Check initial conditions: If world wR is a real possible world, do nothing.
Similarly, if δ is contradictory (that is, if δ ≡ ⊥), do nothing.
2. Compute DNF : In order to handle the formula in an efficient way, we
compute the Disjunctive Normal Form (DNF) of δ, to which we refer as
DNF(δ) = δ1 ∨ . . . ∨ δn.
3. Create imaginary worlds: Create a new imaginary possible world w1, . . . , wn
for each clause δ1, . . . , δn in DNF(δ). This defines the expanded set of pos-
sible worlds as follows:
W+ = W ∪ {w1, . . . , wn}
4. Expand accessibility relation: Once the new possible worlds have been cre-
ated, the AddAlg must create the new addition relations expressing that,
by imagining formula δ at the world of reference wR, the agent has crated
new imaginary worlds w1, . . . , wn. This defines the expanded set of addition
relations as follows:
R+A = RA ∪
( ⋃
i=1...n
{(wR, wi, δ)}
)
5. Expand nominal structure: Now, the AddAlg must add a set of new nomi-
nals to refer to the newly created imaginary worlds. This defines both the
expanded set of nominals, by adding one new nominal ki for each new pos-
sible world wi, and the expanded nominal function, which is an extension
of N :
NOM+ = NOM ∪ {k1, . . . , kn}
N+ = N ∪
( ⋃
i=1...n
{(ki, wi)}
)
6. Expand valuation function: The AddAlg must expand the valuation func-
tion to account for the new imaginary possible worlds. In order to do so, the
algorithm must account for both the atoms that are present in each δi, and
also for the atoms that are true in the world of reference wR and which
should be imported to the new imaginary worlds, provided they do not
appear in δi. Therefore, the definition of the expanded valuation function
involves two different phases:
(a) Clamp new atoms: The AddAlg must set the new valuation functions ac-
cording to the atoms p appearing in δi, for each new imaginary possible
world wi:
V +1 (p) = V (p) ∪
(⋃
i
{wi | p is a positive literal appearing in δi}
)
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(b) Import existing atoms: Then, it must import all the atoms that are true
at world wR, provided they do not appear in δi, for each new imaginary
possible world wi:
V +(p) = V +1 (p) ∪
(⋃
i
{wi | wR ∈ V +1 (p) and p is not a literal of δi}
)
7. The AddAlg has finished its execution: a new set of imaginary possible
worlds satisfying δ has been created, and these worlds are now accessible
through the addition relation RA from the world of reference w
R.
3.4 Semantics
Having presented the four algorithms of the Logic of Imagination Acts, we
define its semantics as follows, for a Model for Imagination ActsM, a possible
world w ∈W , and being p ∈ ATOM, i ∈ NOM, {ϕ,ψ} ⊆ FORM, δ ∈ FORM∗,
ζ ∈ FACT, and α ∈ ACT:
Propositional formulas:
M, w  p iff w ∈ V (p)
M, w  ¬ϕ iff M, w 2 ϕ
M, w  ϕ ∧ ψ iff M, w  ϕ and M, w  ψ
M, w  ϕ ∨ ψ iff M, w  ϕ or M, w  ψ
M, w  ϕ→ ψ iff M, w  ¬ϕ or M, w  ψ
Hybrid and modal formulas:
M, w  i iff N(i) = w and, for every v ∈W , if M, v  i, then
v = w
M, w  @iϕ iff there exists a world v ∈W such that N(i) = v
and M, v  ϕ
M, w  〈Img〉ϕ iff there exists a world v ∈W such that either
(w, v, δ) ∈ RI , (w, v, ζ) ∈ RD, (w, v, α) ∈ RE or
(w, v, δ) ∈ RA and M, v  ϕ
Dynamic imagination formulas:
M, w  Init(δ) iff δ is not contradictory (δ 6≡ ⊥) and either there
already exists v ∈W s.t. (w, v, δ) ∈ RI or, after
executing InitAlg(δ, w), M is expanded into M+
M, w  Descr(ζ) iff either there already exists v ∈W such that
(w, v, ζ) ∈ RD or, after executing DescrAlg(ζ, w),
M is expanded into M+
M, w  Evo(α) iff either there already exists v ∈W such that
(w, v, α) ∈ RE or, after executing EvoAlg(α,w),
M is expanded into M+
M, w  Add(δ) iff δ is not contradictory (δ 6≡ ⊥) and either there
already exists v ∈W s.t. (w, v, δ) ∈ RA or, after
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executing AddAlg(δ, w), M is expanded into M+
Static imagination formulas:
M, w  〈δ〉Iϕ iff there is some v ∈W s.t. (w, v, δ) ∈ RI and it is
the case that M, v  ϕ and M, v  δ
M, w  〈ζ〉Dϕ iff there is some v ∈W s.t. (w, v, ζ) ∈ RD and it is
the case that M, v  ϕ
M, w  〈α〉Eϕ iff there is some v ∈W s.t. (w, v, α) ∈ RE and it is
the case that M, v  ϕ
M, w  〈δ〉Aϕ iff there is some v ∈W s.t. (w, v, δ) ∈ RA and it is
the case that M, v  ϕ and M, v  δ
Recall that the expanded modelM+ is computed by any execution of either
the InitAlg, the DescrAlg, the EvoAlg or the AddAlg; elements W+, R+I , R
+
D,
RE and R
+
A belong to the expanded model M+, and are also computed by
the execution of the previous algorithms.
4 An Example
In this section we provide a brief example of a model in which all four algo-
rithms have been sequentially executed. Although we do not provide a step-by-
step elaboration of each execution due to reasons of space, we briefly highlight
what has happened in each execution. The whole model can be seen in Figure
5, where we highlighted in bold font the atomic propositions that had been
clamped in each world by each algorithm execution. Note that, although we do
not explicitly specify so in this example, the formulas used by the DescrAlg
and the EvoAlg must belong to the sets FACT and SCRIPT in this particular
example.
The initial model was such that only included world w from Figure 5, and
in which the following algorithms were executed in the following order:
1. InitAlg(¬p→ (r∧s), w): When computing the DNF of premise δ = ¬p⇒
(r∧ s), we get p∨ (r∧ s), which means that the algorithm must create two
new imaginary worlds, v1 and v2, satisfying p and r∧s, respectively. As we
can see in the example, once these atomic propositions have been clamped,
only those atomic propositions that hold at w and do not contradict the
already clamped ones are imported in the new imaginary worlds.
2. DescrAlg((r ∧ s)〈→〉(¬q ∨ t ∨ (q ∧ ¬s)), v2): In the next step, the agent
(or we as modelers accounting for the agent’s choices) decides to elaborate
on the static details of imaginary world v2 by using a certain factual rule
ζ. First, the DescrAlg must check whether the antecedent of ζ, which is
(r ∧ s), holds at v2, and it does indeed; now, it must compute the DNF of
the antecedent of ζ, which already is ¬q ∨ t ∨ (q ∧ ¬s), create three new
imaginary worlds, u1, u2 and u3, and clamp the corresponding clause into
them. After doing so, it must import those atomic propositions holding
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w
¬p, q,
¬r,¬s, t
Init:
¬p→ (r ∧ s)
v1
p, q,
¬r,¬s, t
v2
¬p, q,
r, s, t
Descr:
(r ∧ s)〈→〉(¬q ∨ t ∨ (q ∧ ¬s))
u1
¬p,¬q,
r, s, t
u2
¬p, q,
r, s, t
u3
¬p,q,
r,¬s, t
Evo(α):
t〈→〉αp
s ∧ t〈→〉α(p ∧ ¬q)
s[→]α¬r
z1
p, q,
¬r, s, t
z2
p,¬q,
¬r, s, t
Add:
¬p ∨ r
x1
¬p, q,
¬r, s, t
x2
p, q,
r, s, t
Fig. 5 The model for the example, with the execution of each algorithm.
at v2 that do not contradict with the ones already clamped in each new
imaginary world.
3. EvoAlg(α, u2): In this case, recall that the EvoAlg takes an action α as
the argument and then it loops over every script whose main operator is
either 〈→〉α or [→]α. The relevant scripts can be seen in Figure 5. The
first script processed in this step is t〈→〉αp; the EvoAlg checks whether the
antecedent t holds at the world of reference u2 and, as it does, creates a
new imaginary world z1 where it clamps p. Note that the EvoAlg does not
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yet import any atomic propositions from the world of reference, as it must
loop over all the available scripts first. Therefore, the algorithm now moves
on to process script s∧ t〈→〉α(p∧¬q); as the antecedent s∧ t holds at u2,
the algorithm creates a new world z2 and clamps the consequent p ∧ ¬q
into it. Now, the algorithm must process a box-formula s[→]α¬r; as the
antecedent s holds at the world of reference u2, the algorithm must loop
over every already existing imaginary world created in this execution of
EvoAlg and clamp the consequent ¬r into them. At this point, as there are
no more scripts about α, the EvoAlg can import those atomic propositions
holding at u2 that do not contradict with what have been clamped in the
new imaginary worlds z1 and z2.
4. AddAlg(¬p ∨ r, z1): Similarly to what happened in step 1, the algorithm
computes the DNF of δ, which is already ¬p ∨ r, and thus creates two
new worlds, x1 and x2, where it clamps the corresponding formulas ¬p and
r, respectively. Once this has been done, the AddAlg imports those atomic
propositions from z1 that do not contradict with the already clamped ones.
The previous paragraphs highlight how each algorithm has been executed
in the model of the example, and thus account for how the new imaginary
worlds have been created. Recall that, although we have just executed each
algorithm once, and we did so in an ordered fashion, our system allows the
modeler to execute any algorithm at any time (except the InitAlg, which is
required to be executed before any other algorithm in order to create the first
layer of imaginary worlds).
The model shows how the content of the agent’s imaginings changes through
the execution of different processes. As a result of the first execution of the
Init process, the agent creates a certain set of imaginary worlds that account
for the initial premise, but which, aside from that, resemble the real world be-
lieved by the agent in every other way through importing those believed atoms
that do not contradict with the new clamped ones. However, the execution of
further mechanisms of imagination, represented by each step in the model ex-
pansion, provides additional specifications to the imagining, be them in the
form of factual rules, scripts or additional premises, that, in turn, modify the
state of affairs of the imaginary worlds to accommodate such constrains.
This is, in some way, similar to the way an agent updates the set of possible
worlds in epistemic and doxastic logic as a result of receiving new information.
The main difference with respect to those systems is that, whereas gaining
knowledge is often accounted by reducing the number of epistemically plausible
worlds, and updating the agent’s doxastic preferences is usually represented by
modifying the accessibility relations, the update of information in imaginary
worlds is represented by expanding and creating new possible worlds. This aims
to account for the fact that, when elaborating on an imagining, the agent is
not necessarily concerned with the already existing imaginings she may be
entertaining, but rather with “opening” new branches within the imagining.
Furthermore, this approach allows us, as modelers, to trace each and every
one of the steps performed by the agent within a whole imagination episode;
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it allows us to see all the alternative imaginary worlds that have been created
in previous steps, as well as which particular worlds the agent has chosen to
focus on at each step.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
Probably the most interesting feature of the Logic of Imagination Acts is its
dynamic modularity, which amounts to dynamic versatility. An act of imagi-
nation is seen as a sequence of possibly many executions of different processes,
each of them being part of the act of imagination as a whole, but each one of
them distinct enough to account for a particular way in which the imagining
can be elaborated. In this setting, we can see within a particular act of imag-
ination and we can identify and split it into the different processes that take
part in it. The level of detail this approach gives us when modeling the for-
mation and elaboration of imaginary worlds allows us to study the dynamics
of imagination in depth.
Being able to develop imagination acts in a modular, non-brute-forced
way, allows us to represent acts of imagination that can create and develop
imaginary worlds in a wide variety of different ways. We do not define an
exhaustive algorithm detailing each and every possible alternative in an act
of imagination, as if it was a game of chess being analyzed by a computer in
order to check each and every possible move. Instead, we now aim to define a
system that captures the way human beings elaborate on their imagining by
partially exploring one or another possibility, and leaving many options aside.
There are, nevertheless, certain shortcomings in our approach. Regarding
the richness of the logical language, we believe that having an explicit ways of
considering beliefs would be a very interesting addition. Even though we have
already argued, by the end of Section 3.2, how we implicitly interpret beliefs in
this logic, the lack of an explicit operator accounting for the “believe” attitude
limits the interaction our logic can have with this other mental attitude. Our
proposal provides great insights regarding how imaginary worlds are created
and develop, but if we expanded our logic in order to include explicit repre-
sentation for beliefs, we could then explore how those imaginary worlds would
potentially affect the agent’s beliefs. For instance, if we had a way of explicitly
representing the agent’s beliefs in the real worlds, we could study how one fur-
ther algorithm, corresponding to the “realization” of an agent who, through
performing a thought experiment, learns something new, could then update
her beliefs about the real world. In such case, in would also be interesting to
compare our approach to other systems able to deal with belief revision or in-
ternal reasoning steps, such as some applications of Dynamic Epistemic Logic
(see [17] for an overview) and other works devoted to represents the dynamics
of awareness and realization (like in [23]).
We can already forsee in advance, however, how explicitly accounting for
beliefs would pose some challenging questions. If the doxastic relation has
some kind of ordering, such as in the case of the plausibility models defined,
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for instance, in [1], the “believed worlds” that would have to be taken into
account for the algorithms when importing beliefs would always need to be
ones that are actually believed by the agent –in other words, the most plausible
ones, or “top-worlds”. In terms of the dynamics of imagination, therefore, this
would render all the “non-top worlds” effectively useless for our purposes.
An interesting line of research, though, would be how to allow the agent to
imagine that her beliefs are actually different, which would require duplicating
the whole doxastic model in an imaginary setting, but modifying the doxastic
relations appropriately; this would be a first step towards allowing the agent to
imagine, first, that she beliefs something different than she actually does, and
then to allow her to create new imaginary worlds based on her new “imaginary
beliefs”.
Regarding other possible lines of future work, it would be interesting to
study how our logic could be adapted into a first-order setting. Even though
we have chosen to stick to a propositional setting in order to focus on the
dynamics of the imagination mechanisms, expanding our work to account for
individuals would greatly increase its expressive power. With this, it would be
possible to represent how an agent imagines something being something else,
for instance in pretense play –say, a banana being a telephone. Nevertheless,
and as our imaginary worlds are created dynamically via the execution of
the algorithms, this would surely pose some challenges with regards to the
issues of constant and varying domains present in first-order modal systems,
as identified in [11].
Furthermore, we would like to consider how we could add, to the current
system, the mechanisms needed to allow imagination processes to affect not
only the states of affairs represented by imaginary worlds, but also the sets
of rules and scripts holding in there. Currently, imaginary possible worlds can
be indeed different to the real possible worlds, but they are different in terms
of what is the case in there; the factual rules and the scripts believed by the
agent, nevertheless, are constant throughout the model. However, imagination
should be able to alter that as well. It is true that I can imagine that things
are different, but I can also imagine that the rules governing the world are also
different. In order to account for that, we would need to add still one further
layer to our formal models and associate, to each possible world, a particular
set of factual rules and scripts believed in there. This way, the real possible
worlds would account for the factual rules and scripts that the agent actually
believes about the real world, but we could also create an imaginary world in
which such rules and scripts were different.
Due to the nature of how imaginary worlds are gradually developed, it
would also be an interesting contribution to see how our algorithms would
accommodate a paracomplete setting13. In a nutshell, a paracomplete setting
would allow our possible worlds to have certain truth-value gaps, with respect
to certain atomic formulas; this, in turn, would allow us to determine, for each
13 Some logical systems defined by Berto in [2] and [4] allow for both paracomplete and
paraconsistent worlds.
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possible world and atomic formula, whether the formula is true in there, false
in there, or simply undetermined or unspecified. When using this setting, we
could avoid having to import every possible atomic formula from the world
of reference, and thus we could just allow the new imaginary worlds to be
developed in a truly step-by-step way, filling up only those details that are
specified by the corresponding premise, factual rule or script. We think that it
would be interesting to see how our layer of imagination algorithms could be
adapted into such setting, and thus it is an interesting topic for future work.
As a way of complementing this paracomplete setting, we could also consider
adding aboutness14 into the system to import only those atomic formulas that
were related somehow to the details being clamped into the new imaginary
worlds.
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